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This paper mainly discusses the political promotion system in China. Specifically, 
we develop a generalized analytical framework by introducing the contest success 
function. On the one hand, the central government can give the optimal political 
promotion benefits to local officials to incentivize them to exert desirable 
developmental efforts. On the other hand, the central government can undertake a 
further design of the political promotion system to motivate local officials via its 
assigned incentive strengths to the corresponding group and other groups, or via 
its stipulated number of comparable regions in the corresponding group. Our main 
findings in terms of the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit are 
as follows. First, the individual developmental effort and the summed 
developmental efforts are increasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the 
political benefit. Second, the central government’s assigned incentive strength to 
other groups is increasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political 
benefit. Third, the central government’s assigned incentive strength to the 
corresponding group is decreasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the 
political benefit. Fourth, the number of comparable regions in the corresponding 
group is decreasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit.
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1. Introduction
China has achieved a high rate of economic growth and a good outcome of 
economic performance for a long period, which is called “China Miracle” by many 
economists and journalists. Different theoretical studies (e.g., Lin et al., 1993; 
Qian and Xu, 1993; Montinola et al., 1995; Lin and Liu, 2000; Tsui and Wang, 
2004; Jin et al., 2005; Cai and Treisman, 2006; Yao, 2008; Lin, 2009; He and Yao, 
2011; Caldeira, 2012; Zhang, 2012a, 2012b; Gilli and Li, 2013) have put forward 
different viewpoints to explain the political foundation behind “China Miracle” 
from different perspectives. The role of governments at various levels are analyzed 
in depth, and almost all the existing studies greatly stress the role of the central and 
local governments in initiating and maintaining the miraculous development of the 
Chinese economy. 
For example, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) find the angle of Chinese-style 
decentralization, and highlight that the Chinese-style combination of political 
centralization and economic decentralization plays a crucial role. As Blanchard and 
Shleifer (2001, p.176) ingeniously point out, “With respect to China, our analysis 
implies that, to the extent that federalism has played a helpful role in promoting 
China’s economic growth, such federalism relied crucially on the centralizing 
role of the Communist party.” By the words of Frye and Shleifer (1997), political 
centralization can change the local governments’ “grabbing hands” to “helping 
hands.” Xu (2011, p. 1078) originally terms the Chinese-style decentralization 
as the Chinese regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime, and gives a 
more accurate and thorough description and puts it in another way, “On the one 
hand, the national government’s control is substantial in that the Chinese political 
and personnel governance structure has been highly centralized. Subnational 
government officials are appointed from above, and the appointment and promotion 
of subnational government officials serve as powerful instruments for the national 
government to induce regional officials to follow the central government’s policies. 
This feature fundamentally distinguishes the Chinese RDA regime from federalism, 
where governors or mayors are elected and they are supposed to represent and 
be accountable to their constituents. On the other hand, the governance of the 
national economy is delegated to subnational governments. Regional economies 
(provinces, municipalities, and counties) are relatively self-contained, and 
subnational governments have overall responsibility for initiating and coordinating 
reforms, providing public services, and making and enforcing laws within their 
jurisdictions.” Gilli and Li (2013, p. 470) stress the role of reciprocal accountability, 
and they point out, “This dramatic transition was successful because the selectorate 
had efficiently constrained autocratic power with internal checks and balances 
which gave policy makers an incentive to promote economic growth.”
In the background of China, when the role of the central and local governments 
is mentioned, the political promotion system should be placed in an important 
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position. It is such a system that provides the incentives for local officials. The 
purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of the political promotion 
system in China.
This paper hypothesizes that the central government can affect the behaviors of 
local officials through a series of policy tools in the framework of the political 
promotion system in China. Specifically, the central government can give the 
optimal political promotion benefits to local officials to incentivize them to exert 
desirable developmental efforts. Besides, the central government can undertake a 
further design of the political promotion system to motivate local officials via its 
assigned incentive strengths to the corresponding group and other groups, or via its 
stipulated number of comparable regions in the corresponding group. We will use 
the game-theoretical model to prove our hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature 
review in this field. Section 3 establishes the analytical model based on the contest 
success function. Section 4 offers the main results and discusses the design of the 
political promotion system in China. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks 
and points out several potential extensions.
2. Literature review
The literature most related to this paper is one of the most famous and popular 
explanations in China, which is termed as the “promotion tournament model.” This 
model is firstly advanced and coined by Zhou (2004, 2007, 2008). Zhou argues 
that promotion tournaments can serve as a good incentive mechanism to govern 
and incentivize Chinese local officials. Specifically, in the promotion tournaments, 
different local officials from different regions try their best to push forward their 
own jurisdictions’ economic development through using the resources that are 
manipulated by them. In order to formalize the above-mentioned idea in an 
integrated mathematical framework, Zhou (2004) borrows from Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) to build up his formal model. Although Zhou and his coauthors provide 
evidence to empirically support their theoretical hypothesis (see, e.g., Chen et al., 
2005; Li and Zhou, 2005), there are several queries on Zhou’s model (see, e.g., 
Tao et al., 2009, 2010; Su et al., 2012). Firstly, although it is theoretically predicted 
that the local official whose economic performance is better will be promoted, in 
the real world local officials whose economic performance is poorer may also be 
promoted. Secondly, different local officials may have different political networks 
or factional ties (see e.g., Shih et al., 2012), which may play an important role that 
is greatly neglected by Zhou’s model. All these limitations of Zhou’s model tell 
us that the tournament tool based on Lazear and Rosen (1981) is not a perfectly 
suitable one in providing a sound political foundation. 
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Greatly different from Zhou’s (2004) model, this paper tries to borrow from 
Tullock’s (1980) original idea to build a new model based on the stylized facts in 
China. The models of the contest success function have been well-developed and 
applied by many scholars (see, e.g., Skaperdas, 1996; Baik, 1998; Dasgupta and 
Nti, 1998; Rai and Sarin, 2009; Corchón and Dahm, 2010). In this paper, we will 
show that Tullock’s conceptual framework can be used to construct an economic 
theory of the political promotion system in China.
This paper can be seen as an extension of Pi (2012). The differences between 
this paper and Pi (2012) are reflected in the following respects. Firstly, Pi (2012) 
focuses mainly on the role of political networks by introducing a bias-coefficient, 
which favors the network-connected local officials and discriminates against 
the unconnected local officials. However, this paper neglects the role of political 
networks in Pi’s (2012) sense. Secondly, Pi (2012) assumes that there are one central 
government and two regions, and that each region has only one representative local 
official. However, this paper supposes that there are one central government and 
N regions, where N ≥ 2. In other words, Pi (2012) takes the number of regions or 
local officials in the same contest as given, but this paper looks upon the number 
of regions or local officials as a policy tool of the central government. Through 
designing the size of the contest in the political promotion, the central government 
can achieve some desirable outcomes. Thirdly, the local official’s assigned weights 
to the political benefit and the private benefit are treated in different ways. In Pi 
(2012), the sum of the assigned weights is not taken as a constant, however, in this 
paper the sum of the assigned weights is taken as a constant. Pi (2012) aims at 
exploring the independent effects of the assigned weights, while this paper tries to 
investigate the dependent effects of the assigned weights. More importantly, the 
tradeoff related to the assigned weights neglected by Pi (2012) can be thoroughly 
examined in this paper.
Here, it should be noted that there are some studies giving deep-seated supports 
for this paper. For example, Groves et al. (1995, p. 889) find that “improved 
managerial selection can occur under the aegis of the bureaucratic system. As 
such, the development of nascent managerial labor markets can play an important 
subsidiary role in the overall transition to a market economy.” Such kind of 
evidence lays the foundation for concept of the local official’s developmental 
effort. According to Cao et al. (2017, p. 13), “although forced turnover of non-
politically connected CEOs leads to performance improvement in all firms, 
forced turnover of politically connected CEOs leads to performance improvement 
only in firms that are politically advantaged.” This shows that the efficiency of 
the local official’s developmental effort may depend on the types of political 
connection. In the new situation, the local official’s developmental effort needs to 
keep pace with the times.
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3. Model of analysis
In order to capture the stylized facts in China, we use a dynamic game to depict 
the political promotion system. There are two kinds of players, namely the central 
government and local officials. The central government and local officials play 
a two-stage dynamic game. At the first stage, the central government chooses its 
policy action to incentivize local officials to promote economic growth in their own 
jurisdictions. At the second stage, local officials simultaneously choose their effort 
levels to maximize their utility functions. The game can be analyzed by backward 
induction.
There are two types of efforts that can be exerted by each local official, namely 
the developmental effort and the non-developmental effort, and both developmental 
and non-developmental efforts can be taken at the same time. The developmental 
effort can be used to give an impetus to the local jurisdiction’s economic 
development, while the non-developmental effort can be used to produce some 
kind of private benefit for the local official. Each local official’s total effort is e–, 
which is the sum of his developmental and non-developmental efforts. When the 
local official exerts one unit of effort, no matter whether developmental or non-
developmental, he will be incurred a unit cost of θ. If the local official expends 
the developmental effort, he will obtain a political promotion benefit G with a 
probability determined by the contest success function. One unit of developmental 
effort will produce one unit of efficacy of economic development (e.g., one unit 
of economic growth rate or one unit of fiscal revenue). However, when the local 
official exerts the non-developmental effort, he will get a private benefit with 
certainty. One unit of non-developmental effort will generate V units of private 
benefit. The private benefit may be legal or illegal in the background of transition. 
When the central government launches the anti-corruption campaign, the private 
benefit will tend to appear in the form of being legal. The local official assigns a 
weight of α to the political benefit, and a weight of 1 – α to the private benefit, where 
0 < α  < 1. Different values of α reflect that the local official may have different 
promotional prospects or value orientations.
We suppose that there are N ≥ 2 regions, and that each region has only one 
representative local official. Local official i in region i exerts developmental effort
ei, and the sum of developmental efforts exerted by other local officials in other 






= ∑ . For simplicity, we assume that one
unit of developmental effort can yield one unit of output. According to Zhou (2004) 
and Pi (2012), these N regions can be seen as a group of comparable jurisdictions, 
that is to say, local officials of these N regions undertake a contest to get the political 
promotion benefit G (e.g., higher political positions or better treatment) that is 
offered by the central government. Here, the political promotion benefit G can 
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be seen as the central government’s policy action and is subject to a total amount 
restriction, but it does not constitute the central government’s costs. Moreover, 
comparable jurisdictions are an important terminology coined by Zhou (2004), 
which are defined on the basis of the administrative relation and the geographical 
pattern. Zhou (2004) uses this terminology in the sense that the external shocks 
are common or similar to the jurisdictions in the same group when different local 
officials exerts developmental efforts to promote economic growth.









Equation (1) shows that each local official has a positive probability to succeed and 
win the political promotion benefit as long as he exerts a positive developmental 
effort.
Local official i’s utility function can be expressed as:
 (1 )( )i i iY e e V p G eα α θ= − − + − , (2)
where e– – ei denotes local official i’s non-developmental effort. In order to make 












Substituting Equation (1) into Equation (2), we can obtain:
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.  (3)
According to the first-order condition of Equation (3) and using the symmetry of 












Here, it should be noted that e in Equation (4) is independent of θ because 
developmental and non-developmental efforts are addable and separable and at the 
same time their sum is a constant e–.
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The central government can provide a total political promotion benefit G– to all the 
local officials in different contests, but in the same contest it can only assign G to the 
corresponding group of comparable jurisdictions which is composed of N regions, 
and the remainder G– – G will be assigned to other groups of comparable jurisdictions. 
On the one hand, the central government needs to incentivize local officials in the 
corresponding group to exert the developmental effort as much as possible, and 
it assigns an incentive strength ρ to the corresponding group. On the other hand, as 
there are other groups, the central government also needs to incentivize local officials 
in these groups, and it assigns an incentive strength μ to these groups. 
Thus, the utility function of the central government can be expressed as:
 
1




∑ .  (6)
There are three points that should be noted. Firstly, ρ and μ are independent, which 
reflects that the fact that central government will give different incentive strengths 
to fundamentally different groups that are distinguished by the corresponding 
group and the non-corresponding groups. The difference of incentive strengths is 
determined by the fact that different groups have different initial conditions and 
development opportunities. Secondly, as for the political promotion benefit, we 
set the utility function of local officials (i.e., Equation (2)) as linear and the utility 
function of the central government (i.e., Equation (6)) as log-linear. The logic 
behind this setting is that rank-oriented local officials take the political promotion 
benefit as “political money” that generates constant marginal utility, while the 
development-oriented central government treats the political promotion benefit as a 
normal good that engenders diminishing marginal utility. 
Thirdly, the central government care about the total outputs, which is an important 
characteristic of the developmental state (see e.g., Wade, 1990; Nee et al., 2007; 
Riskin, 2009; Knight and Ding, 2012; Knight, 2014) and constitutes the cornerstone 
of the political promotion system in China.
Substituting Equation (5) into Equation (6), we can obtain:
 ( 1)









From the first-order condition of Equation (7), we can get the equilibrium value of G:









Throughout the paper, we use the superscript * to denote the equilibrium state.
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4. Results and discussion
In this section, we will give the fundamental results and discuss how to design the 
political promotion system in China.
4.1. Fundamental results
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.  
There is one point about N worth mentioning. Although N is not continuous in 
rigorously mathematical sense, we can treat it as if continuous. Such kind of 
treatment is very prevalent in the existing literature (e.g., endogenous entry) that 
uses game theory as an analytical tool.
Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium assigned political promotion benefit is 
decreasing in the number of comparable regions in the corresponding group, the 
central government’s assigned incentive strength to other groups, and the local 
official’s private benefit, but increasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the 
political benefit, and the central government’s assigned incentive strength to the 
corresponding group.
Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (4), we can get:
 *
2
( 1) (1 )
(1 ) ( 1)






[ ].  (9)
Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (5), we can obtain:
 ( 1) (1 )N N VE Gα α µ− −= −* [ ]
(1 ) ( 1)N V Nα αρ− −
.  (10)
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Based on Equations (9) and (10), we can obtain Proposition 2.
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From Proposition 2, we know that at equilibrium both the individual developmental 
effort and the summed developmental efforts are increasing in the local official’s 
assigned weight to the political benefit, and decreasing in the local official’s private 
benefit. However, at equilibrium the individual developmental effort is decreasing 
in the number of comparable regions in the corresponding group, but in contrast, 
the summed developmental efforts are increasing in the number of comparable 
regions in the corresponding group.
Both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 fit in well with our economic intuition, which 
provides a sound ground for the design of the political promotion system in China 
that will be explored in the following section.
4.2. Discussion of the political promotion system
In this subsection, we will discuss the design of the political promotion system in 
China. 
We treat the two-stage dynamic game in Section 2 as a subgame of a bigger game, 
and pay our attention to the central government’s political promotion design. 
Before the game in Section 2 is played, the central government firstly moves, 
who chooses its assigned incentive strength to other groups (μ), or its assigned 
incentive strength to the corresponding group (ρ), or its stipulated number 
of regions in the corresponding group (N). In this bigger game, the central 
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government has the power to design the political promotion system. There is no 
commitment problem both on the side of the central government and on the side 
of local officials. That is to say, neither the central government nor local officials 
will violate the contract terms. In order to solve this bigger game, we still use 
backward induction. 
Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (7), we can obtain:
 (1 ) ( 1)
ln[ ] [ ]
( 1) (1 ) ( 1)
N V N N VU G
N N V N
α µ αρ αµµ
αρ α αρ
− −= + −
− − −
.  (11)
Given ρ and N, differentiating Equation (11) with respect to μ, we can get:

















































































Proposition 3 implies that at equilibrium the central government’s assigned 
incentive strength to other groups is increasing in the local official’s assigned 
weight to the political benefit, and the central government’s assigned incentive 
strength to the corresponding group and the number of comparable regions in the 
mentioned group, but decreasing in the local official’s private benefit.
Given μ and N, differentiating Equation (11) with respect to ρ, we can get:
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. 
Proposition 4 implies that at equilibrium the central government’s assigned 
incentive strength to the corresponding group is decreasing in the local official’s 
assigned weight to the political benefit and the number of comparable regions in the 
corresponding group, but increasing in the central government’s assigned incentive 
strength to other groups and the local official’s private benefit.
Given μ and ρ, differentiating Equation (11) with respect to N, we can get:
 
* (1 )1
(1 ) (1 )
G VN
G V G V
ρα α µ
ρα α µ ρα α µ
−= = +
− − − −
.  (14)
Here, it should be noted that we neglect the integer constraint of N, and such kind of 
treatment is common in the existing studies with endogenous entry.
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Proposition 5 implies that at equilibrium the number of comparable regions in 
the corresponding group is decreasing in the local official’s assigned weight to 
the political benefit, the central government’s assigned incentive strength to the 
corresponding group, but increasing in the central government’s assigned incentive 
strength to other groups, and the local official’s private benefit.
Propositions 3-5 have plentiful policy implications. The central government can adopt 
suitable policy tools to incentivize local officials to promote economic development 
via μ, ρ or N. That is to say, the central government has a toolbox with different tools, 
which can make China’s political promotion system work as efficiently as possible.
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Of course, China’s political promotion system is very complex, and this paper only 
provides a simple description from the perspective of political economy. Although 
there are many variables abstracted away for the sake of simplicity, we have 
remained the most important variables (e.g. μ, ρ, N) that are in line with the stylized 
facts in China. The policy tools mentioned above are often explicitly or implicitly 
employed by the Chinese central government.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, the political promotion system in China has been explored in 
a theoretical way. Specifically, a generalized analytical framework has been 
established by introducing the contest success function. In the bigger game, on 
the one hand, at the second stage of the dynamic game, the central government 
can choose the optimal political promotion benefits to incentivize local officials; 
on the other hand, at the first stage of the dynamic game, the central government 
can undertake the further design of the political promotion system, such as 
choosing the optimal assigned incentive strength to the corresponding group, or 
the optimal assigned incentive strength to other groups, or the optimal number of 
comparable regions in the same contest.
There are several potential extensions for future research. Firstly, the basic model 
can be extended by considering the more general case that different local officials 
may have different production abilities in transforming their developmental efforts 
into the efficacy of economic development. Secondly, a more complex form of 
the contest success function can be adopted to reflect the fact that different local 
officials may have different contest abilities that are embodied by different political 
networks just as Pi does. Thirdly, the private benefit can be divided into two 
categories, namely the corrupt type and the non-corrupt type, and we can develop 
a more detailed model to cope with the corrupt activities. Fourthly, the system 
covered in this model is not peculiar to China, and the model can be adjusted in 
some way that allows adding elements peculiar to hierarchical rent-seeking contests. 
Fifthly, some empirical evidences based on Chinese panel dataset can be provided 
to support the theoretical conclusions. Sixthly, in the future research it will be 
necessary to study the government’s legitimacy function of consistently delivered 
values, together with economic and social progress, with strict commitment to the 
public interest taking precedence over the form of governance. Finally, in recent 
years, China’s policy frameworks have increasingly reflected the inherent tension 
between the long-standing imperative of ensuring social and political stability and 
the more modern objective of market liberalization. These two objectives may be in 
direct conflict with each other, and such kind of conflict should be incorporated into 
the theoretical model in the future.
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Ekonomska analiza sustava političke promocije u Kini1
Jiancai Pi2
Sažetak
U ovom se radu istražuje sustav političke promocije u Kini. Naime, razvijen je opći 
analitički okvir uz uvođenje funkcije uspješnosti natjecanja. S jedne strane, 
središnja vlada može pogodnosti optimalne političke promocije ustupiti 
predstavnicima lokalne vlasti kako bi ih potaknula na dodatni napor za 
ostvarivanje poželjnih razvojnih ciljeva. S druge strane, središnja vlada može se 
obvezati na daljnje osmišljavanje sustava političke promocije kako bi motivirala 
predstavnike lokalne vlasti dodjeljivanjem snažnih poticaja odgovarajućoj skupini 
i drugim skupinama, ili putem propisanog broja usporedivih regija u odgovarajućoj 
skupini. Glavni rezultati ovog istraživanja u svezi su pondera političke koristi 
predstavnika lokalne vlasti.. Prvo, pojedinačni i ukupni razvojni napori povećavaju 
ponder političke koristi predstavnika lokalne vlasti. Drugo, poticajna snaga 
središnje vlade dodijeljene ostalim skupinama utječe na povećanje pondera 
političke koristi predsatvnika lokalne vlasti. Treće, poticajna snaga središnje vlade 
dodijeljene odgovarajućoj skupini utječe na smanjivanje pondera političke koristi 
predstavnika lokalne vlasti. Četvrto, broj usporedivih regija u odgovarajućoj 
skupini smanjuje se u odnosu na ponder političke koristi predstavnika lokalne 
vlasti.
Ključne riječi: politička promocija /promicanje, Kinesko čudo, funkcija uspješnog 
natjecanja, model promotivnog turnira, predstavnik lokalne vlasti 
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